Cooperative Electric Power Supply System in Distribution Networks for Power Supply in Disasters

Abstract

This paper proposes a cooperative electric power supply system based on cooperative game theory, aiming to design monetary incentives for consumers to install energy resources that contribute to the continuous power supply to them in case of power interruption by disasters. The proposed system designs the incentives by maximizing the long-term profits gained by controlling photovoltaic generation systems (PVs), controllable loads, and batteries during normal operations. The proposed system employs a two-stage optimization method for scheduling battery operations under the uncertainty of PV generation during normal operations to alleviate its heavy computational burden. Since the profit allocated to each consumer participating in the proposed system is determined based on the imputation in the core, the solution of cooperative game theory, the consumers have no incentive to leave the grand coalition. When the power supply from the distribution network is interrupted during the disaster, the consumers cooperate to control their PVs and batteries to continue supplying the electric power to them using the installed resources until the power supply is restored. The effectiveness of the proposed system is verified by computational experiments under normal and disaster conditions.