The Japanese Myth of Nuclear Power Plant Safety

Abstract

 Despite being an earthquake-prone country, and in spite of the lack of an internal base of development of nuclear power during the 1950-60s, Japan has recently grown up to be the number three nuclear power country in the world. Consequently the distinguishing trait of the Japanese policy of nuclear power is the top-down processing of the construction of plants one after another. But that process inevitably creates the myth of safety．“Japan is the last country for severe accidents.” In this paper I analyze the constructive process of the myth and its change from myth to scientific rationality.

 Firstly, regardless of world trends, the consistent location/construction of plants has become a faits accompli. This accomplished fact justified and reinforced the safeguard and safety factor borrowed from the USA. The driving force of power plant construction was so strong that it trivialized and absorbed the severity of Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, and a series of less severe accidents in Japan. By exploiting differences in reactor types and internal states of affairs, and by the otherization of Chernobyl, the myth is "scientifically" rationalized. After getting through a series of quakes, Japanese plants looked to be based on superior quake-proof techniques because made in Japan with high quality.

 Secondly, this "quake-proofness" has been legalized in legal cases. The great difference of knowledge/power between defendants and plaintiffs makes victory for the former inevitable.

 Lastly, after the severe Fukushima accident, the reoperation of plants is admitted without clearing up the cause, or satisfactory confirmation of safety. Social rationality prevails over scientific rationality. In this point, Beck‘s conflict schema of these rationalities is called into question.