Abstract
Liberalism and self-determination are based on a typical modern age idea of person: From Locke and Kant to the contemporary English-American Bioethic studies, the self-consciousness stands at the center of this idea. According to this idea of person, as is known, the embryo and disabled newborn are excluded from persons. On one hand we must keep this idea, which supports the thought of self-determination, the credo of the liberal society. On the other hand, however, we need to revise the idea of person. Focusing on the issues of the disabled embryo and newborn, I criticize this idea of person and suggest a revised idea instead. To be noticed is the phenomenon emphasized by sociology and psychology that the self shows up not alone but through interaction with others. This phenomenon suggets that the self-consciousness includes by nature the consciousness of others. To argue this is the point of this study. Should the self-consciousness include recognition of others, it is to be shown that a man would be a person, only if he is recognized. Then the matter of the idea of person is not that of the definiton of person. The problem is whether we can deny the recognition of others. From this point I also try to restrict self-determination: Abortion is not to be justified by the self-determination of the persons concerned: of parents, in particular of mothers.
