Abstract
This paper aims to clarify the behavioral principle of accounting standard-setters from the perspective of political power. In this paper, we present a behavioral model which assumes that the setters produce their strategies suitable for the environment they confront, construct any network structures to carry out the strategies, and take actions. Besides, we examine validity of this model through an organizational structure analysis using social network analysis, focusing on the standard-setting of the FASB in the late 2000s. According to the results, it becomes evident that the FASB, which confronted the ultimate dangerous situation for setting standards, attempted to build up an alliance with user actors for its own survival ; formed the organization which was dominated by regulators and the user actors ; and developed actively innovative standards. Such an action corresponds to the “Opposite wind type behavior” in the model developed in this paper. This indicates that this model could generally explain the behavior of the FASB at that time.
