Abstract
In cases of Capgras syndrome, the <I> of a familiar person (or his "haecceity" that is entirely different from his attributes) vanishes in front of the patient. In other words, the patient with Capgras syndrome experiences "pure death." If death means the vanishing of the <I> in essence, can we say whether such a death is good or bad? Otherwise, is it possible to say anything good or bad about death? Analytical philosophy tells us that it is difficult to say something good or bad with regard to absent subjects. This suggests that it is impossible to say anything either good or bad about dead persons who do not exist in this world. Here, we lose the point at which the meaning of death converges, whether it may be the death of ourselves or others. Nonetheless, if we dare to look further for the meaning of death, it comes to be meaningful only when death is taken as a change of the <I>, not as its extinction. However, the change of the <I> is neither noticeable nor relatable to <I>. What is left for the meaning of death is nothingness, i.e., just the deaths of others in the form of the vanishing of the neighboring <I> and the death of oneself in the form of the vanishing of the self <I> in the future.
