The limit and usefulness of the concept of a person in bioethics

Abstract

　　The concept of a person is central to the discussions of life and death in bioethics. This concept plays a significant role in the arguments over the moral status of human life particularly in the early stages of life, such as the fetus. However, since personhood is assumed to be a kind of ability or character (self-consciousness) and being a person is tied to the moral status, it raises the moral dilemma that human beings which are not regarded as a person have no moral status. Since the concept of a person plays the reason of such a consequence, the question arises whether this concept is useful for the discussion in medical ethics.

　　 Whereas Ludwig Siep positively answers this question and develops his own concept of a person, Dieter Birnbacher answers negatively and suggests full abandonment of the concept of a person from medical ethics. In this paper, I will clarify that Siep’s attempt fails and that the proposal by Birnbacher is partially wrong by inquiring about the moral acceptability of voluntary active euthanasia. By doing this, I show the usefulness of the concept of a person in medical ethics.