Consensus Government in the German Federal States: A Study of Coalition Patterns in Schleswig - Holstein

Abstract

This article attempts to give an explanation of grand coalition formations in German federal states. There is less attention to a systematic assessment of why political parties seek to form grand coalitions in the framework of an international comparison.

Empirical coalition studies tend to theorize simple causation, while more theory oriented studies are less focus on diverse interactions between party behaviours and institutional settings in the subnational coalition games.

To fill the gap, this study offers a configurative analysis to be applied for coalition research. The case-based method is a welcome tool for systematic analysis of multiple-conjunctural pathways. As a result of the analysis of coalition patterns in the German federal states, this article suggests a combinatorial effect of institutional settings, i.e. strong controls by parliament minorities.

This theoretical conclusion regarding grand coalitions is hypothesized as follows: Grand coalitions can be considered as a last resort under the institutional condition if polarized political parties face a problem of majority building.