Technocrat Finance Ministers and Economic Voting: Does Technocratic Policy-Making Disturb Electoral Accountability?

Abstract

The influence of non-partisan technocrat experts is expanding in governments’ policy-making. Though the appointment of technocrats allows governments to use their expertise, which ordinary politicians lack, some scholars have raised concerns about its consequences for government accountability to the people. Examining the interactive effect of economic performance and the appointment of technocrat finance ministers on the electoral results of 21 European democracies, we empirically tested whether the involvement of technocrats disturbs accountability. Based on the literature on accountability and retrospective voting, we hypothesized that the appointment of a technocrat prevents the people from electorally penalizing a government for poor policy performance in the policy area for which the technocrat is responsible. The results show that poor economic performance correlates with electoral losses by incumbent parties under ordinary finance ministers but not under technocrat finance ministers. These findings imply that the appointment of technocrats prevents the people from holding governments accountable to them.