Parliamentary Party Organizations and Bicameral Legislatures

From a Comparison of Japan and Australia

Abstract

This article examined how upper chambers affect activities of parliamentary parties through case studies of Japan and Australia, where legislatures consist of two chambers with almost equal powers. We argue that under symmetrical bicameralisms interests of members of parliaments are not coordinated within parliaments, but parties. In other words, policy-making organizations within parliamentary parties are coordination mechanisms between two houses. To demonstrate this argument, we analyzed MPs’ policymaking activities within parties. In the countries, the parties’ policy committees review government bills before the introduction of them to the legislatures. Also, members of upper chambers hold the chairs of party policy committees. In addition, in a case of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, its policy affairs research committee divisions become active when members of oppositions hold committee chairs of the upper house. The results showed that the existence of the strong upper house affects party organizations.