Predominance of the Prime Minister and Discretionary Dissolution

Elections Under the Abe Administration and Constitutional Law

Abstract

The Prime Minister’s predominance under the Abe administration was the result of a series of institutional reforms since the 1990s and political conditions created by elections. In this paper, I discuss the utility of the mechanism of restraint/equilibrium against the Prime Minister’s predominance. The Constitution of Japan contains relatively simple provisions regarding governing bodies with a wide margin for interpretation of the text. To regulate discretionary power such as the dissolution of the House of Representatives, rules formed by mutual understanding between political actors (conventions or “political law”) are an important link between the text of the Constitution and its application. From this perspective, I examine the possibility of restrictions on the discretionary dissolution by Cabinet (substantially by the Prime Minister). In addition, I discuss the necessity of restriction by law and rational practices in relation to the issue of the Cabinet not responding to the demands of opposition groups for the convening of an extraordinary session.