Abstract
This paper analyzes relationship between prime ministers and the House of Councilors in postwar Japanese politics. It takes into account that prime ministers act under two constraints in having cabinet sponsored bills approved in the Diet. The first is that the amount of time available for bill examination is much restricted. The second is that the House of Councilors is independent and cannot be dissolved. Because of this independence it is harder for prime ministers to gain support for bills from the House of Councilors than from the House of Representatives. Given the two constraints, prime ministers have secured support for bills prior to bill examination in the Houser of Councilors through various measures. Past research has often argued that the role of House of Councilors is marginal as it seldom amends, rejects, or tables bills sent from the House of Representatives, acting as if it were a “carbon copy” of Representatives. This paper shows that the House of Councilors has projected diverse influence in Japanese politics and that the high rate of approving bills only demonstrates that prime ministers have been successful in obtaining support from majority of the House of Councilors prior to bill examination.
