Abstract
‘Libertarianism as a theory of justice’ aims to demonstrate the justness of property rights in
terms of personal rights (protecting negative freedom). Since Robert Nozick’s theory of historical
entitlements appeared, many authors have attempted to provide a philosophical justification for
libertarianism as a theory of justice. Among them is Hillel Steiner who pursues the possibility of libertarianism as a theory of justice by presenting a coherent theory of rights. In this paper, I argue that Steiner’s theory of rights leads us to see left-libertarianism as the definitive version of a libertarian theory of justice. As I see it, Steiner’s theory successfully shows that: first, the system of libertarian justice consists of a system of perfect duties, not of imperfect duties; second, exploring the general content of (property) rights is analytically significant for a libertarian theory of justice; third, libertarianism as a theory of justice should employ an egalitarian rule of allocating resources. Although Steiner’s theory of rights has at least two problems, I argue, his argument advances a distinct theory of libertarian justice at the level of ideal theory.