The Annals of Legal Philosophy
Online ISSN : 2435-1075
Print ISSN : 0387-2890
Significance and Problem of Dworkin's Moral Interpretation
Compared with ‘Originalism’, on the Case of Abortion
Nozomi HAYAKAWA
Author information
JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

2007 Volume 2006 Pages 158-167,261

Details
Abstract
Ronald Dworkin's theory about the ‘moral reading’ of the Constituion has made an influence not only on legal theories but also on constitutional theories through our country. The feature of his theory is on the point that he understands the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, as a comprehensive system of abstract moral principles.
My aim in this paper is to clarify the characteristics of his theory by comparing a very different type of theory, the ‘Originalism’. I also look at the abortion case. Examining how the two theories argue over this case, I try to discuss not only the signigficance about Dworkin' s theory, but also its problem as well.
Content from these authors
© Japan Association of Legal Philosophy
Previous article Next article
feedback
Top