Abstract
Operating under the principle of "checks and balances" between the legislative and the executive branches, the U.S. Congress possesses a considerable amount of power in foreign and trade policy-making process. In particular, Congress has wielded a great deal of influence over the President's trade policy, of which such congressional power has been guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution which reads: "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." (Article 1, Section 8). This article will examine the U.S.-China relations over the Most Favored Nation (MFN)status from 1989 to 1994, from the aspect of "checks and balances" between President and Congress. In the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen incident in June 1989, Congress applied heavy pressure on the President to publicly condemn China for its human rights abuse. With the Congress explicitly linking human rights with the renewal of China's MFN status,the issue of MFN became a contentious trade issue between the U.S. and Chinese governments in the early 1990s. The congressional actions from 1989 to 1994 can be best understood in the following four categories: Congress-Bush conflict over sanctions against China (1989-90); the linkage of the MFN and human rights (1990-1991); the presidential election and MFN as an election issue (1992); the MFN issue under the Clinton administration (1993-94). I argue that President Bush successfully negotiated with China by placing himself between China and Congress, while President Clinton lost his diplomatic maneuver-ability vis-a-vis China by overemphasizing human rights issue. Bush exerted strong pressure on China on the diplomatic front, while, on the domestic front, he continually vetoed legislations on Chinese human rights issue passed by Congress. On the other hand, Clinton's decision to adopt the Democratic Congress' position on MFN created a condition where the mechanism of "checks and balances" no longer functioned properly.
