Reaction Time and Dishonest Behaviors

Abstract

In this study of economic decision-making, we conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the relationship between dishonest behaviors and their reaction times. Dishonest behavior is defined here as the decision to lie to increase own monetary payoff. We divided participants into three groups to examine the heterogeneity of the extent of lying: Group 1= the Honest group, comprising people who always made honest decisions; Group 2= the Big Liars’ group, comprising people who always made dishonest decisions; and Group 3= the Liars’ group, comprising people who sometimes made honest decisions and sometimes made dishonest decisions. The reaction times for all decisions, including honest decisions, were significantly longer in the Liars’ group than in the Honest group, but there was no statistically significant difference between the mean reaction times of the Big liars’ group and Liars’ group. Panel data analysis of each group revealed two results. First, the Honest group made honest decisions even when a dishonest decision would result in a large payoff, but their reaction times for such decisions were long. Second, in the Liars’ group, there was a non-linear relationship between dishonest behaviors and reaction times; that is, the reaction times for honest decisions and those for dishonest decisions receiving maximal payoff were lower than those for dishonest decisions receiving medium payoff.