The Development of the Meaning of the Word φνοιζ up to Aristotle

Abstract

Of the manifold meanings of the word φυσιζ, I have selected for my present brief treatment the core of its archaism on the one hand and its meaning 'matter' or 'stuff' on the other hand as an example of those of comparatively later development These two meanings, if contrasted to each other, would give some notion of the general features of the history of the word I 'Φυσιζ' in its archaic sense does but point to that ultimate truth of research which lies too far away from this world and too deep hidden for any words The central idea which Xenophanes' fr 18 expresses (found also in other writers) crystallizes itself precisely in the word φυσιζ of Heraclitus' frr 1, 123 The suggestion that the 'φυσιζ' there might be the same thing as Harmony, Logos, Fire, etc, would be but an obstacle to our penetration into the very life of the word In Philolaus' fr 6 (ad init), the φυσιζ, unlike εστω, eludes at least human knowledge In Plato's Seventh Epistle 341 d, the Heraclitean archaism is obvious And, as in his Phaedrus 270 cd, one cannot define the φυσιζ of a thing except by taking a certain circuitous way Thus, it was only under the all-important condition of an inquiring attitude that 'φυσιζ' could stand for some ultimate truth, hence Heraclitus' adoption of this word in reproaching Hesiod (fr 106), and even Aristotle's in similar passages (e g Metaph, 1000 a 21) Parmenides' disuse of 'φυσιζ' in the extant part concerning the Truth is, I think, due just to the goddess being the revealer of the ultimate reality His way of expression in the places where 'οδοζ διξησιοζ' is spoken of rather betrays his sneering attitude toward any human research In Plato's Theaet 173 e-175 c, on the contrary, 'φυσιζ' is three times found governed (directly or indirectly) by 'ξητειν', 'ερευνασθαι', 'διεριυνασθαι', and 'σκεψιζ', and this inquiry (never to be identified with 'περι φυσεωζ ιστορια' in the Phaedo 96 a) he declares to be the Philosophy Lastly, the difference between 'φυσιζ' in its archaic sense and 'ον', 'ουσια', etc should not be overlooked In the f r 2 of Diogenes of Apolloma, 'φυσιζ' denotes such ultimateness as can no longer be sufficiently expressed by 'εοντα' Aristotle, Metaph 1003 b 22-24, together with Phys A 3, helps us see the difference between φυσιζ and Parmemdes' εον Alexander's Commentary teaches that here ον as well as εν is an επινοια and predicate of φυσιζ, the υποκειμενον We might well say, therefore, Parmenides has only the εον in view, and not the transcendent φυσιζ that makes its multi-lateral appearance to our thinking Again, Plato's Theaet (loc cit) makes a fairly clear distinction between φυσιζ and τι εστιν (an interpretation proposed in opposition to Dr Holwerda) The archaism reaches its culmination in Plato And in order to excavate it, one should not rely too much upon the testimonies of later writers, above all of Aristotle, who once for all transfigured and sometimes made less profound the word, partly by neglecting in his enumeration of its various meanings in. Metaph Δ 4-(and Phys B 1) the above-mentioned archaism, and partly by depriving it of the vivacity and depth in its implication, hence e g his juxtaposition of 'ουσια' to 'φυσιζ' as synonymous II It is probably this same attitude of Aristotle that caused him in the above passages to formulate compactly and conceptualize technically the meaning of 'φυσιζ' as 'matter' or 'stuff' for the first time (his philosophical preference of ειδοζ to υλη) as the more genuine φυσιζ has nothing to do with that wording of his, and is here out of question) Plato's suspected loci, Legg 891c and Phil 29a, betray his hesitation in giving the

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