The cognitive-load effects associated with lying on useful field of view: Focusing on the falsity and intentionality of lies

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the cognitive loads of lying narrow an individual’s useful field of view (UFOV). After first being assigned to either liar or control groups, participants were requested to memorize a presented playing card, to respond with either the same or different card-information (match or mismatch conditions), and then to identify the position of a white dot appearing after their responses. The two groups differed in terms of the instructions provided: liar-group participants were instructed to deceive the experimenter by acting sincerely while lying but control-group participants were not asked to do so. The results indicate the UFOV for liar-group participants was narrower than for control participants, although no UFOV differences were observed between the match and mismatch conditions. These findings suggest that the cognitive loads of intentionally deceiving others (intentionality) narrows the UFOV but merely providing false information (falsity) and acting sincerely while lying do not.