Abstract
In regard to the causal induction based on contingency information, the probabilistic contrast, or the difference between the probability of the effect (e) in the presence of the cause (c), and the probability of the effect in the absence of the cause have been regarded as the appropriate measure of perceived causality in many studies. This article proposes a new model of causal induction which is called the dual-factor heuristics (DH) model. The DH model is based on the two important factors of causal inference: P(e|c), the predictability of the effect, and P(c|e), the compatibility of the cause. In an experiment, participants made causal judgments from sequential presentations of information about occurrences and non-occurrences of an effect in the presence and absence of possible causes. Participants' judgments were better predicted by the DH model than models based on the probabilistic contrast. Effects of the probabilistic contrast, however, barely detected, and it was considered to be caused by mixed strategies of the participants. The results were discussed from the viewpoint of adaptive rationality.
