Abstract
Evaluation systems have been rapidly introduced in the field of education in Japan since the late 1990s at the school, local, and national levels. Today, two types of evaluation systems are used in the administration of local educational institutions. One is the public sector evaluation system that has been implemented in the local governments. As per this system, the Board of Education should evaluate its programs using unified forms and processes, similar to mayoral bureaus. The other is the so-called "Inspections and Evaluations" system, which was enacted by the Law Concerning the Organization and Functions of Local Educational Administration in 2007. As per this system, the Board should perform evaluations on its own terms. This article examines the impact of these systems at the local government level from the viewpoint of democratic control over the administration of educational institutions. Evaluation systems have particular significance for democratic control over administrative bureaucracies. Over the past few decades, members of Boards of Education have played a limited role in policy processes, due to their "delicate" positions as appointed (as against elected) part-time members. In this situation, the new systems could provide them with effective means to control policy processes. It would also help us to analyze whether these systems promote democratic control. The first section of the present article discusses the characteristics of the two systems, including their similarities and differences. The second section deals with the case of the Nakano Ward Government (NWG), in which public sector evaluation has been implemented since 2001. The NWG evaluation system includes internal evaluation (self-evaluation) and external evaluation (by an evaluation committee). Interviews were conducted with ward staff and committee members and observations made of the external evaluation and a meeting of the Board of Education in 2009. The characteristics of the NWG evaluation system are revealed in comparison with the evaluation systems of other ward governments in Tokyo. In conclusion, while the public sector evaluation system emphasizes outcomes and cost benefits, the Inspections and Evaluations system stresses the status of programs rather than their outcomes and costs. In the NWG, the external evaluation committee, especially its local resident members, play active roles in the evaluation process, while the Board members have only limited passive roles. Some results of external evaluations concerning cost reduction have led to reforms, but other recommendations could not be put into practice. Consequently, the public sector evaluation system in NWG surpasses the Inspections and Evaluations systems of the other wards by offering more detailed and effective information ; however, as a means of democratic control, it has limitations. In the future, we should consider how evaluation systems work as an effective means of democratic control. In order to reach any generalization, additional empirical research of other cities should also be conducted.
