Abstract
This study was intended to investigate the coalition tactics of the weaks under the situation where four players in the power relationship such as “A>B=C=D, A<(B+C+D)” struggled for new resources of power. Subjects were 128 male undergraduates divided into 32 groups of four members each. The experimental design was 2 (determinants of power strength; resouce size or rank order)×2 (range of power distance between the strong and the weaks; large or small). As the result, it was revealed that the weaks preferred revolutional coalition “BCD” under the condition where the resource size determined the power strength, while preferred getting-ahead coalition “AB, AC, AD” under the condition where the rank order determined, and that expansion of power distance reinforced such tendency of the weaks. It was also shown, however, that the weaks did not always form the coalitions as they had hoped before bargaining. In conclusion, the necessity to examine the characteristcs of the weaks' mentalities and behaviors in coalition bargaining was suggested.
