Japanese Journal of Risk Analysis
Online ISSN : 2435-8436
Print ISSN : 2435-8428
Short Articles
On Equilibrium Analysis in Common-Pool Resource Game with Population Uncertainty
Haruki MIYASHITA
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JOURNAL OPEN ACCESS

2022 Volume 31 Issue 3 Pages 231-234

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Abstract

In this study, we examine the effects of population uncertainty on the equilibrium in common-pool resource game. We create a hypothetical strategic environment where each player was randomly drawn from a pool of potential players. It shows that the equilibrium investment is higher when the number of opponents is a common knowledge than when the number of opponents is uncertain. Moreover, population uncertainty in common-pool resource game might prevent the tragedy of the commons.

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© 2022 The Society for Risk Analysis, Japan

この記事はクリエイティブ・コモンズ [表示 4.0 国際]ライセンスの下に提供されています。
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.ja
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