SECURITY GAMES TAKING ACCOUNT OF INVASION ROUTES AND ATTRITION

Abstract

This paper deals with security games which would be found around our lives. In a facility represented by a network, several types of invaders/attackers conflict with security guards/defenders who have also several security teams. The attacker chooses an invasion path to move along. He incurs some attrition by the conflict on arcs but surviving attackers give damage to the facility on his invasion route while the defender tries to minimize the damage by intercepting the attacker by a limited number of guards. The defender takes a randomized plan with respect to the adoption of each security team and the deployment of guards. Since the attacker know the defender's randomized plan before his decision making, the security problem is modeled by a Stackelberg game with the superiority of the attacker on information acquisition to the defender. There has been no research on the security game with multiple types of players modeled on a network, which explicitly takes account attrition on players. By some numerical examples, we investigate the best configuration of staff numbers in security teams and some characteristics of optimal defense to mitigate the damage caused by the attackers.