From the Virtue of Testimonial Justice to a Transformative Virtue

Abstract

    This paper proposes a transformative virtue that counteracts testimonial injustice by responding to two critiques of the virtue of testimonial justice. First, I demonstrate that self-reflection can function in more varied ways than the direct detection of oneʼs own prejudices, as previously assumed in the literature. Hence, self-reflection can holistically be effective in neutralizing the influence of oneʼs prejudices on oneʼs beliefs. Second, I propose a virtue that encourages epistemic agents to be epistemically acute enough to experience dissonance between perceiving a particular testifier (who is talking in person) as trustworthy and having biased beliefs about the testifierʼs trustworthiness: transformative virtue. Third, I argue that the development of a proper indirect contact theory with relevant epistemic practices can offer epistemic environments that facilitate peopleʼs critical imagination to cultivate a transformative virtue, considering the risk of victimized epistemic agentsʼ vulnerability.