Adam Smith and Stoic Philosophy

Abstract

This article intends to reconsider the relationship between stoic philosophy and the theory of self-command in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Hitherto, in Western studies, it has been thought that Smith had treated stoic philosophy consistently from the first edition to the sixth edition. However, in my view, concerning the theory of self-command, Smith seemed to criticize stoic philosophy in the sixth edition.
In the first edition (1759), Smith comprehended that the virtue of perfect self-command was regarded as stoical heroism or, as it were, stoic virtue. In addition, he realized that the impartial spectator had to maintain a stoic magnanimity. Moreover, in the second edition (1761), according to the supplement of Epictetus' quotation in Part III, Smith emphasized stoic virtue as a means towards of the perfection of human nature. Therefore, with regard to the perfection of human nature, Smith recognized self-command as an integral part of the theory of virtue. However, in the sixth edition (1790), Smith evidently criticized the stoical apathy, which is not true self-command but lack of sensibility. Smith noticed that it was so dangerous to restrain the natural course of passions, and that the habitual most perfect self-command, though it was acquired via many hardships, might tend to fall into insensibility. Hence, Smith pointed out the proper relationship between self-command and sensibility in practical morality.