Abstract
The auther formulates three different models of the independence of the judiciary with different types of popular control. They differ from each other in the rules of clecision, the personnel, and accordingly the concept of the independence of the judiciary in special reference to the ideology and conscience of the judge.
The bureaucracy model comprises officially confirmed formal rules of decision, bureaucrats, and priority of such rules to the personal ideology and conscience. Popular control is excercised through people's participation in the formulating process of the rules both of the court decision and of the fulfillment of the judge's office.
The profession model comprises the law to be found by trained lawyers, judges as the most skilled law-finders, consciencious law-fining as free from personal ideology. Popular control exists when the judge's office is taken by the most popular lawyer in terms of his skill in realizing client's rights.
The politics model comprises rules pledged by the prospected judge, governing elite with statesmanship, observance of the plege conscienciously taken on the basis of his personal ideology. People vote for the pledge and its performance, or, at least, for the policy of the appointing agent who is elected by the people.
Various judicial systems are refered to in such countries as Germany, France, Italy, England, U.S.A., Switzerland and Japan. The auther concludes that the Japanese system, which is eqipped with some parts of each of the three models, is markedly wanting in popular control in any view of them to the result that the independence of the judiciary is currently in crisis in the people's mind.
