On the Need for Recognition in Liberal Society

Philosophical and Historical Perspectives

Abstract

Why do claims for recognition of identity never subside, even under liberal societies where each individual is treated equally? Are these to be understood as negations of liberal society? With the intention of making a contribution to discussions about the subject of rights/law, this article approaches the question from two perspectives: philosophical and historical.
First, by tracing the genesis and development of the "self" in the light of philosophical anthropology in the 20th century, this article articulates how the structure of "persona", which means both "personality" and "masquerade", is constitutive of "I". It also shows that recognition by others plays a crucial role, so that recognition should be counted as one of the human conditions. Second, the reason why the claims for recognition of identity are peculiar in modern society can be explained by the history of "the ethics of authenticity", which reflects the change of sources of identity, from socially derived to inwardly derived ones. This articulates the logic of "the politics of recognition" that, while inspiring autonomy, criticizes difference-blind policy in liberal society as a type of alienation.
If our society should be both liberal and decent, it has to consider how it can meet the need for recognition. It is not only because non- or misrecognition seriously distorts "persona", but also because the supposedly neutral liberal subject is a "persona", and therefore demanding each individual to be such a subject is itself a kind of violence which is imposed upon them. This article suggests that liberal society needs to inquire into the possibility to treat each individual not as a subject "already become" but as a subject "always becoming", and in this sense as if he/she is always an "alien" or "stranger" living in society.