Abstract
What implication does Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity have for sociology? In this paper, we will attempt to answer this question by examining the notion of "gender as performative."
Initially, we will point out two problems regarding the concept of performativity, a concept that is underpinned by Jacques Derrida's notion of "iterability." One problem is that the idea of gender as constructed through actions remains unclear. Another problem lies with the normative proposition that "subversion" should be adopted as a feminist strategy, a proposition that lacks sufficient grounds.
However, if we move away from Derrida's concept, and instead investigate why Butler criticized the notion of gender as "socially constructed difference between sexes," then we will be able to pose a more accurate interpretation of the concept of performativity.
Butler, in her criticism of the notion of gender, stated that "between free will and determinism," our thought was limited by "linguistic restriction." Here, we interpret this "restriction" as the logical limit of a causal explanation of human actions; it cannot deal with the very distinctive features of human actions, which are inherently described by society members, using language.
The kind of identity we have in social settings is logically dependant on the description that we use to understand our actions. We organize our social lives using the logical connections between various concepts we have regarding actions, identities, bodies, and so on. Taking the concept of performativity as an expression of such logical connections, we will be able to give empirical accounts of the idea of gender, as constructed through actions.
