Abstract
In early postwar Japan, the democratization of social relationships was the most essential and inevitable ideal. Scholars at that time in the field of family studies have tried to consider how the “democratization of the family” was realized. These studies certainly had limitations, in that they regarded the familial relationship as exceptional when compared to other social relationships. However, their ideals don't lose significance in themselves. Although the ideal of “democratization of the family” has been criticized and ignored by sociologists, we must reconsider these criticisms and take this ideal back.
Recently, Anthony Giddens has idealized “intimacy as democracy” or the “democratic family,” with the emergence of what he calls a “pure relationship.” His ideal, which might seem to be an anachronism, has been criticized by many sociologists in terms of his ignorance of economic factors, his optimism and so on. However, I regard these criticisms as being derived from misunderstandings of Giddens's idea of the transformation of intimacy. This paper will reconsider the intention of Giddens and clarify why “democratization of the family” matters in late modernity. The result will suggest that the democratization of the family depends on the “decentralization of the family,” though that sounds paradoxical. To decentralize the family is the ideal which argues a wide range of relationships must share individual risks through separating family functions from family structures. In this sense, this ideal combines ‘individual autonomy’ and ‘social solidarity’. The democratization of family promotes the decentralization of family, or vice versa. This is why we must defend and value the democratization of the family. Now we need to reevaluate the democratization of the family, and therefore its decentralization, as an uncompleted project.
