Abstract
Equality of opportunity (EOP) is a significant normative principle underlying the workings of modern society. In the study of social stratification, it has been interpreted as “perfect mobility” (PM), which means that people's social statuses are statistically independent of their parents'. However, this interpretation has recently been criticized for its lack of theoretical relevance. Critics posit that the intergenerational association of statuses does not imply inequality of opportunity because association can be the consequence of people's own choices based on their own preferences formed under equal opportunities. This criticism is persuasive because it rightly points out that PM ignores the significance of individual responsibility, which is a normative basis of egalitarianism. In this paper, I attempt to defend the traditional idea that PM can be used as a benchmark of EOP in the study of social stratification, by reconsidering the theoretical relationship between the concepts of EOP, equality of outcome, and PM.
Analyses based on a simple theoretical model produce the following results. First, a society that gives people equal opportunities must meet the condition that people's social statuses are determined not by their parents' statuses but by personal factors (e.g., preferences, efforts, choices) for which they themselves are responsible. Second, while EOP implies PM, PM does not imply EOP because PM ignores the significance of individual responsibility. Third, the conventional view that simply identifies EOP with PM cannot avoid the criticism mentioned above. However, if the concept of “social stratification” is defined more appropriately, and if this definition is adequately applied to empirical research, the debate can be resolved because the assumption about preference formation that critics made will then no longer hold. Finally, some implications of these findings for future empirical and theoretical research are suggested.
