Abstract
For the sociologists who regard phenomenology as something significant for sociology, it seems to become a crucial question whether phenomenology is metatheoretically or theoretically significant for social sciences.
This paper purposes to answer this question through the following analyses.
(1) To examine this question in terms of Schutz's system. This examination makes clear that this question is derived from Schutz's system.
(2) To explain that it is of somewhat contradictive nature in Schutz's system that phenomenology is theoretically significant for social sciences. This explanation clarifies that phenomenology is only metatheoretically significant for social sciences in Schutz's system.
(3) To show that it is not contradictory to Husserl's system that phenomenology is only metatheoretically significant for social sciences.
These analyses make clear and valid that phenomenology is only metatheoretically significant for social sciences.
