Abstract
A contribution towards isolating the problems attendant upon theory formulation in contemporary sociology is suggested through the comparative analysis of Weber's sociological method and the fundamental principles of natural science. While it can be seen in a discussion of Weber and Cassirer's critical analysis of the epistemology of exact sciences that both concur that the cognitive process there is contingent upon a 'frame of recognition' to make intelligible a finite part of the infinite reality.
Cassirer went beyond Weber's initial insight that the laws basic to such a 'frame of reference' are abstractions from repeatedly observable facts, when he contended that, as such, the concept of 'function' replaces that of 'substance'. This is a phenomenon which Cassirer traces to its roots in Galileo's initial works. Weber's identification of a regularity in the epistemology of the exact sciences is a shortcoming which stems from a failure to recognise this point. It takes a more concrete form in Weber's definition of his 'ideal types' as the foundation of an epistemology for the social sciences, in that the obstruction to scientific recognition not recognised in the exact sciences is subsequently reproduced here in the epistemology of the social sciences as well.
By isolating this flaw as being one evident in both the exact sciences and contemporary sociology, and by comparing the two respective epistemologies' problematic aspects with reference to law formation, problems apparently relevant only to the exact sciences may be located and used as guides for enhancing the scientific recognition essential to the valid development of laws for sociology.
