Abstract
In our study, we investigated the effect of each player's decision making considering the opponent's “cooperativeness” (how cooperative the opponent is) on the evolution of cooperation in various types of networks. We analyzed the evolution of cooperation in the population in the cases where each player “doesn't refer to his/her opponent's cooperativeness”, “refers to his/her opponent's cooperativeness with him/herself” and “refers to his/her opponent's cooperativeness with all of the opponent's neighbors”.
As a result of our study, we have clarified the two following facts: (a) In the population where each player refers to his/her opponent's cooperativeness, cooperation doesn't decline so much as an increase of each player's temptation to defect on a cooperator. In general, if each player doesn't consider his/her opponent's cooperativeness, coooperation is hard to promote. However, each player's decision making considering his/her opponent's cooperativeness can restrain the evolution of defection. (b) In particular, on the complex networks such as Small World network and Scale Free network, cooperation is easier to promote in the population where each player considers his/her opponent's cooperativeness with “all of the opponent's neighbors”, than in the population where each player refers to his/her opponent's cooperativeness with “the player him/herself”.
