2010 Volume 7 Pages 24-40
Given that there are individuals who are in need of help, why is it that public assistance extended by the state is of far great significance than any personal aid or religious benevolence? The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the theoretical foundation of public assistance or, more concretely, to examine the perspectives of the Rawlsian theory of justice and the Sen's capability approach on this issue. Why is carrying out an even resource distribution according to individuals' needs unconditionally and sufficiently justified? The tentative conclusion of this paper is to complement Rawls' spirit on the difference principle, based primarily on Sen's conception of the right to well-being, and on conceptions such as "synnnetry before risks," "broadening the conception of responsibility," and "broadening the conception of contribution," which can be induced by reinterpreting Aristotle's classical ethics on justice.
