Transactions of the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers Series C
Online ISSN : 1884-8354
Print ISSN : 0387-5024
Control Optimization for a Designer's Intention Through the Nash Bargaining Model
Kunihiro NAKAMOTOYasuo KONISHIKatsuya KONDOHiroyuki ISHIGAKI
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2000 Volume 66 Issue 644 Pages 1223-1229

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Abstract

This paper explains an optimum design concept for a designer's intentions in controller design. We consider multi-objective optimization through the Nash bargaining model ; an optimum solution attainable from Nash's study. We then optimize a feedback gain of LQR(Linear Quadric Regulator)on a motor-mass system to show the concept's effectiveness. In achieving the LQR optimization, we aim to simultaneously reduce output errors and input amplitude. Based on the Nash bargaining model, the criterions, output errors and input amplitude, are represented by numeric values, called utilities, which formulate a compromise point. Afterwards, a design solution is evaluated from this point. The resultant solution satisfies a designer's intention.

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© The Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers
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