Dilthey's Psychology as Metatheory of Psychology and the Human Sciences(<Special Section>New Frontier of the Metatheory for Psychology and Human Sciences)

Abstract

In this paper, I will explore the metatheory in psychology and human science in relation to Dilthey's psychology. I will utilize two methods. First, I will examine Dilthey's psychology in late 19th-century Germany. I have found that Dilthey's psychology has two characteristics; not only empirical psychology but also metatheory of psychology. However, due to this ambiguity his psychology was criticized by both psychologists and philosophers in his day. And at the same time, the metatheory which his psychology contained vanished from the main stream of psychology. Second, I will reconsider Dilthey's psychology from these two characteristics. His empirical psychology is the foundation of various sciences in that it stands between the sciences and their object. On the other hand, his meta-psychology provides a principle to his psychology which is considered a basic science. As a result, Dilthey's meta-psychology opens up a world of a person-centered point of view to psychology and the human sciences.