A Plea for Epistemic Sortalism:

Individuation and the Grasp of Sortal Concepts

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to give appropriate rejoinders to some typical objections to Epistemic Sortalism (ES) and thus to vindicate ES from them. ES argues that in epistemically individuating an object, a subject of perception needs to grasp under which sortal concept the object falls. ES has been, however, questioned lately in terms of both the possibility of misconceptions or ignorance of sortal concepts and the conflict with some current psychological research. I shall show that these objections pose no threat to ES, by examining the notion of ‘individuation' and thereby reorganizing ES as a specific epistemological theory concerning discriminating and identifying knowledge. Based on the relevant ontology, i.e., the constitution view, newly reconstructed ES requires an individuator to grasp the sortal concept of an object as an epistemic evidence.