Modal Status of Laws of Nature

Abstract

In this paper, I defend the contingency view on the laws of nature: laws of nature hold in metaphysically contingent way. First, I present an argument to demonstrate that categorical properties exist, and point out that the contingency view follows if we accept the existence of categorical properties. Second, through the critical examination of the view that laws of nature hold in metaphysically necessary way, I point out that we should take the conceivability into consideration in deciding the range of possibility and hence we should accept the contingency view. Third, I argue that this paper's approach to appeal to the conceivability mitigate the severity of a problem with categorical properties, that is, a problem of quiddity. Finally, I argue the philosophical implication of the contingency view in relation to contemporary Humeanism. In my view, though it may sound strange, those who support contemporary Humean metaphysics should take a rationalistic stance.