Abstract
In the mid-1960s, the Japan-U.S. alliance was institutionalized through the establishment of its first two working-level consultations. The Japanese and U.S. governments held the first meeting of the Policy Planning Talks in 1964, and as a consequence of discussions via this channel, the Security Subcommittee (SSC) was set up in 1967. It is the alliance's character as a “Secretarial Alliance” (managed by working-level policymakers not ministers of governments) that makes this a critical juncture for the development of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Indeed, these consultations have served as a mechanism for transforming the alliance, enabling it to adapt to a changing external environment. The origins of the consultations, however, are yet to be analyzed.
In this article, I argue that this alliance institutionalization was caused by “the diffusion of power” in two dimensions. First, nuclear capability diffused; China achieved a nuclear explosion in 1964, ending the U.S.-Soviet nuclear duopoly in Asia. Second, economic power diffused; since the late 1950s, Japan had been in high economic growth while the U.S. suffered balance of payments deficits.
“The diffusion of power” prompted the establishment of the two channels through the intensification of U.S. requirements toward Japan to assume a share of the U.S. defense burden in Asia, the emergence of mutual fear, and the burgeoning necessity of role-sharing. The Policy Planning Talks was established as a channel through which U.S. policymakers could educate the Japanese government in defining its own security interests. In so doing, Washington expected Japan, a growing but reluctant ally, to assume a share of the burden of defending the interests of “the Free World” in Asia, offsetting the political influence of nuclear China.
The SSC was created as a result of mutual fear. First, Japan's sense of anxiety over the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence against Chinese nukes came to the surface. Tokyo needed the SSC to safeguard the credibility of the U.S. commitment. Second, a U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy toward Japan emerged. Due to Japan's rising nuclear potential concomitant with economic growth, Washington sought to prevent it from becoming a military power by influencing its defense strategy through the SSC.
In addition, the establishment of the SSC was a consequence of the growing necessity of role-sharing between the two countries. As deterioration of balance of payments led U.S. forces to withdraw from Japan, Japanese defense experts planned to build-up supportive capability for the U.S. to come to the aid of Japan in an emergency. U.S. policymakers, caught by a newborn dilemma between expectations for Japan's assumption of a share of the U.S. defense burden and fear of its resurgence as a military power, opted to restrict Japan's strengthened capability to supplementary roles within U.S. strategy. The SSC was established as a forum to coordinate this role-sharing.
