2011 Volume 2011 Issue 163 Pages 163_41-54
While the United States engaged in the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it played a leading role in the general and complete disarmament (GCD) negotiation in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This article focuses on the fact that the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles was a contentious issue between the Cold War enemies in the GCD negotiation, and examines how the U.S. government handled the matter as it strived to maintain U.S. nuclear superiority.
Soon after the beginning of the GCD negotiation in 1959, the United States and the Soviets took different positions on the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles. The latter proposed to abolish them at the first stage of the GCD process. This approach, however, was unacceptable for Washington because it would greatly reduce U.S. nuclear deterrent essential for the defense of the West particularly in Europe where the conventional military balance was in favor of the East. Moreover, the Eisenhower administration overestimated Soviet missile capabilities against a backdrop of the heated missile gap controversy. Although a U.S. disarmament plan included missile control measures in order to resist the Soviet propaganda offensive and to maintain the solidarity of the West, the Eisenhower administration had no intention to adopt such measures.
The Kennedy administration's position on the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles was heavily influenced by its obsession with U.S. nuclear superiority. In short, it preferred securing it through the nuclear arms race with the Soviets to making progresses in nuclear disarmament in cooperation with the Soviets at the expense of U.S. nuclear superiority. The Kennedy administration, which was deeply skeptical about Moscow, assumed that U.S. nuclear superiority had enhanced the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrent not only to the Soviets but also to the U.S. allies. Therefore, although it studied such measures as the asymmetric reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, for example, to parity with the Soviets and the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles in advance of that of conventional weapons and armed forces, they were never proposed at the GCD negotiation.
Of course, this doesn't mean that the United States should take all the responsibility for failing to achieve an agreement on the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and, more generally, to stop the Cold War nuclear arms race at that time. Nevertheless, it was ironic in retrospect that the Soviets attained parity with the United States in terms of the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by the early 1970s. The U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity was achieved through competitive arms buildup rather than negotiated disarmament.
