Nuclear Sharing Policy under the Johnson Administration: NATO's Nuclear Problem and the Adoption of the Consultation Approach

Abstract

The U.S. nuclear sharing policy for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started in the late 1950s. The policy's initial objective was to enhance the NATO's defense capability and its readiness by providing the nonnuclear allies with military training for the use of nuclear weapons which were to be transferred from the U.S. custody in case of emergency. However, after the Soviet Union's successful launch of Sputnik, the nuclear sharing was also beginning to be recognized as an effective nuclear nonproliferation measure for the European allies since Washington anticipated that it could provide further reassurance for the allies and allay their concerns about the reliability of the U.S. extended deterrence. In this context, located at “the front line” and sensitive about the credibility and reliability of the US extended deterrence, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had become the most important allies that affected the nuclear sharing policy during the Cold War period.
For the US government, allowing the Germans too much “access” to its nuclear weapons through the nuclear sharing arrangement might cause serious concerns of other major allies, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Therefore, finding a West Germany's fair “share” in the NATO nuclear defense and, at the same time, avoiding other allies to raise concerns against it was the critical requirement for the success of the nuclear sharing policy. From the latter half of the 1950's to the late 1960s, U.S. government tackled this NATO's nuclear problem by exploring the two different approaches: “hardware solution” or “collective nuclear force approach” and “consultation approach”.
The Johnson years were the critical time because the decision was made to adopt the consultation approach, which led to the creation of NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966. By focusing on the decision-making process and using newly declassified documents, this article will explain that the three deferent processes had affected the decision: the stagnation process of the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal, the process of gaining acceptance of the consultation approach, and the process of growing momentum to materialize the approach.