The Atlantic Alliance in the Era of Détente and Multipolarity: The US, France and the NATO Declaration

Abstract

The early 1970s witnessed the transformation of the Cold War structure accompanied by a trend towards détente and multipolarity. As a result, the transatlantic relations became strained. Nevertheless, in June 1974, the NATO Heads of Government singed the “NATO Declaration”, mainly prepared by France and the US, which highlighted the importance of the Alliance original function: “deterrence and defense”. It also reaffirmed the transatlantic cohesiveness, and thus put an end to the transatlantic rift of 1973.
This article sets out to explain why such a declaration was prepared during the period when the Cold War structure underwent transformation. It argues that American and French concerns over its strategic environment, and the mutual fears between two countries played an important role in the process.
America's sense of anxiety over the weakening of the Alliance led to its “Year of Europe” initiative in April 1973. First, the US feared the Soviet attempt to “finlandize” Europe through détente; and second the domestic pressures for US troop withdrawal from Europe and the Western domestic disregard for the Alliance. To prevent it, the US called for Europeans to be engaged in the drafting of a “new Atlantic charter” dealing with the political, military and economic issues, through which it tried to give the impression at home and abroad of the transatlantic cohesiveness. However, a “charter” was never prepared due to French objection.
Instead, France found meaning only in a declaration on military issues. The arms control negotiations and the Prevention of Nuclear War agreement led by both superpowers raised French concerns over the credibility of US extended deterrence, the Western domestic pressures for defense budget cut, and the value of its nuclear forces. To safeguard the US military commitment and to justify each ally's defense effort, in September, France submitted its own NATO Declaration draft, which reflected its concerns and emphasized the importance of the original function, “deterrence and defense”. The draft was adopted as a basis for discussion in NATO.
Despite the new transatlantic tension over the fourth Arab-Israeli War, the work on the declaration continued. The US didn't abandon the project, owing to fears that it could be advantageous to the USSR. Moreover, since French participation was indispensable to show the transatlantic cohesiveness, the US behaved with restraint towards France. On the other hand, the war reinforced French concerns. Therefore, France also adopted a flexible attitude to secure the declaration, while continually criticizing a US-Soviet “condominium”. Despite their disagreements, both countries finally compromised to achieve the declaration. As this article shows, although the crisis in the transatlantic relations in 1973 is well known, it is significant to notice that the members of the Alliance rediscovered the importance of the “deterrence and defense” function due to the anxieties in the era of détente and multipolarity.