British Guarantee to Poland and the Defence Strategy of the Empire
The Eve of the Second World War : International Relations in Summer, 1939
1982 Volume 1982 Issue 72 Pages 24-39,L7
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1982 Volume 1982 Issue 72 Pages 24-39,L7
In the spring of 1939, Britain was faced with the possibility of the triple war against Germany, Italy and Japan. Towards the end of February, the British government set about a general reappraisal of the imperial defence programmes, and, by the summer of the year, the conclusion of the appralial was to proceed with defensive strategic planning giving top priority to Home defence. This conclusion was grounded upon the deep-seated reluctance on the part of the British policy-makers to become committed to a direct military confrontation with Germany.
The British government's response to the crisis of Rumania, and then of Poland, in March 1939, must be analysed within the context described above.
The British policy adopted during the first two weeks after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia was intended, not for saving a particular victim from German aggression, but rather for deterring the action beforehand by organizing a ‘peace front’ in South-Eastern Europe or by issuing ‘a general statement’ against militaly aggression, whereby to avert, or postpone, entering war with Germany. The British guarantee to Poland was announced on 31st March in the hope that the statement might produce ‘deterrent effect’ if presented before German took any military actions.
On the contrary, it was true that Britain, as a result of that statement, had become committed to the war with Germany, which the British policy-makers were well aware of. But the British government laid down some strict conditions for giving support to Poland ; for example, the statement did not constitute a guarantee for maintaining the existing borders indefinitely. These conditions were, so to speak, the guarantee to Britain, which was to safeguard as far as possible the British position to avoid war with Germany.
On the eve of the World War, the British government, returning strategically to the defensive planning of the Home Island, cotinued utmost diplomatic efforts to eliminate the casus belli.
