An Essay on Alliance Structures and Stability in the International System

Security: Theory and Policy

Abstract

There have been many controversial perspectives concerning relations between the distribution of power and stability within the international system. Among such perspectives, two seemingly contradictory theories, the balance-of-power theory and the hegemonic-stability theory, are the more prominent frameworks applied. The balance-of-power theory argues that an even distribution of power creates a more stable system, whereas the hegemonic-stability theory asserts that a preponderance of power is conducive to creating a stable system.
This article attempts to resolve the contradiction between these two theories by re-examining alliance structures within both theories. There are three different interpretations of balance-of-power theory that assert nations balance against power, while the hegemonic-stability theory suggests that an alliance forms around the hegemon. By combining these arguments, we can deduce four different alliance patterns: namely, coalition; two-parties' balance; multi-parties' balance; and hegemony. Coalition is the alliance pattern formed against the strongest nation. Two-parties' balance is that formed between two parties checking each other. Multi-parties' balance is that formed among three or more parties checking one another. Hegemony is that formed with the strongest nation. Though these four alliance patterns have been treated separately, by using logics of alliance formation, it is possible to explain them in a consistent and coherent way.
Re-examination of relations between the distribution of power and stability within the international system in terms of alliance structures enables us to integrate the balance-of-power theory and the hegemonic-stability theory. Whether a nation prefers autonomy or security affects its alliance strategy. If a nation prefers autonomy, it is a risk-taker and generally chooses the balancing strategy; namely, to ally with a weaker power in the system, whereas if a nation prefers security, it is a risk-averter and generally chooses the bandwagoning strategy; namely, to ally with a stronger power in the system. The combinations of nations' preferences determine what kind of alliance relationship or alliance structure is formed, which in turn affects the stability in the international system.
The three-nation-model and four-nation-model show that contradictions between balance-of-power theory and hegemonic-stability theory derive from the fact that alliance structures assumed by each of theories may be both stable and unstable, depending on combinations of nations' preferences. The analysis suggests that an approach which constructs conditions of the system by combining nations' attributes is effective in analyzing relations between the distribution of power and stability within the international system. Though the result of the analysis is applicable only to a three or four nation system, it may suggest some implications which may be used to apply to more than four nations systems and further empirical studies.