The Cold War and Decolonization: French-American Relations during the Algerian War
Reviewing the Cold War History
2003 Volume 2003 Issue 134 Pages 70-85,L12
Details
2003 Volume 2003 Issue 134 Pages 70-85,L12
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the Cold War in the light of thinking and perceptions of political leaders in France and the United States toward the Algerian War. The author tries to seize rhetorical aspects of the Cold War, showing how the leaders made use of Cold War rhetorics in order to seek for the aimed national interests in the sphere where communist threats did not matter. Here the study is focused mainly on the years 1956-1958, from the birth of the Socialist-led government to the return to power of Charles de Gaulle, during which this war, enlarged and internationalized, seriously damaged relations between the two countries.
The nationalist movements in North Africa were embodied and dominated almost exclusively by non-communist Moslems. The communist influence there was very limited and weak. Both French and American administrators knew it well.
After the WWII, French authorities sought to keep at any cost their presence in the region, while the US chose the “middle-road-of-policy”, which opposed both to an endless continuation of colonial domination and to radical and revolutionary changes involved in immediate independence of colonies.
From the beginning of the Algerian War, the French government asked the US for diplomatic support and cooperation concerning the conflict, which the former affirmed officially was a domestic affair. The Mollet government used a Cold War rhetoric according to which the French retreat from Algeria would lead to a Soviet penetration and communist domination there.
The US supported French war efforts for fear that the loss of French presence in North Africa should bring about too heavy a burden for the US to carry for the need of security in the region. But, as the war continued, intensified and internationalized since 1956, the US found it more and more difficult to support the French who were unable to defeat the nationalist rebellion and to realize a “liberal solution”. At last, by the beginning of 1958, the US came to think of its commitment to an international solution to the conflict in order to keep Western influence in North Africa.
