2007 Volume 2007 Issue 148 Pages 29-42,L7
Far Eastern Division of the U.S. State Department, which played quite important role in policy making in that decade, changed its policy in .February 1937. Hornbeck, Chief of the Division, abandoned his idea that international loan including Japan to China would stabilize the Far East and tried for concluding the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with China in exchange for abolition of extraterritoriality in China. It means the transformation from a policy which would contain Japan under U. S. -Japan conciliation to a policy which would pursue American trade interests under cooperation with China and Japan. The change of American understandings on Chinese-Japanese relations during Japanese aggressions into North China played an important role in this transformation.
In the first stage of Japanese aggressions into North China in 1935, the United States estimated that if Chinese counter Japanese with armed force, Japanese aggressions would escalate into total war. They believed their interests were in trade relations with China and Japanese aggressions into North China would violate their interests. However, the United States prevented Chinese armed resistance through diplomatic channel, because if Japanese aggressions escalate into total war, their violation of U. S. interests would not be confined in North China but extended to all over China. Thus, it was quite important for the United States that Chinese do not counter Japanese aggression with armed force in this stage.
But American understandings of Chinese-Japanese relations gradually changed in 1936. In February, they started to think that Chinese-Japanese relations did not have imminent importance to American interests in China. And in May, they finally concluded that while Japanese aggressions into North China would progress, it would not lead to total war between China and Japan. I argued that it was the reason why the United States observed that Chinese became strong enough to confine the disputes within North China, while Japanese lacked strong intention to extend their armed aggressions. Far Eastern Division recognized deadlock of Japanese aggressions into North China because of tensions between Soviet Union and Japan, success of the Chinese Monetary System Reform and reinforcement of Chiang Kaishek's position in domestic politics after death of Hu Han-min.
United States did not act against Japanese foreign policy toward China until late 1930s. However, it did not mean either that the United States agreed to Japanese foreign policy toward China or that the effort of Far Eastern Division always lead to pro-Chinese policy.
