Japanese Evaluation to the Reform of Electoral Institution in the Lower House

Abstract

  The purpose of this article is to examine the effects of electoral reform and tendency toward Duvergerian equilibrium in the lower house elections in Japan to voters. At first, using aggregate data of voting, we confirm the tendency to the Duvergerian equilibrium at the single-member district level. Next, in order to test the relationship between voter turnout and effective number of candidates (ENC) in the SMDs, we estimate OLS regression. After that, combining calculated the ENCs with survey datasets, we observe voters’ perception about satisfaction to election results, belief to function of election, and external efficacy.
  Here we have two main findings. The one is the positive relationship between voter turnout and the ENCs at the SMDs. The other is the robustness of the voters’ perceptions to electoral reform and the tendency toward the Duvergerian equilibrium at the SMDs. From these findings, we conclude that Japanese voters do not share so pessimistic views as some critics to current electoral system and bi-partism. Simultaneously, we argue that we should be cautious of abstention and the validity of survey datasets.