Opposition Strategy and Judicial Behavior of the Italian Constitutional Court

Abstract

  Since courts generally lack the power to enforce their decisions, the rulings are not implemented if governments refuse to comply. How, then, can courts overcome the risk of non-compliance? Per the extant literature, public support for courts and electoral backlash against non-compliance incentivize governments to comply, helping courts overcome this risk. However, voters do not necessarily electorally punish governments’ failures or underachievement — it is conditional on whether electoral accountability works well. This study hypothesizes that an opposition call for compliance facilitates the proper functioning of electoral accountability for compliance with court rulings, and therefore enables judicial branches to freely make the decisions they want. This study tests that hypothesis using judgments of the Italian Constitutional Court, which has faced the risk of non-compliance. The results of regression analysis show that the Italian Constitutional Court is more likely to rule a statute unconstitutional when the opposition objected to the statute under review at the time of its legislation. This implies that opposition strategy holds the government accountable for non-compliance with judicial decisions and enables the judicial branches to overcome the risk of non-compliance. For courts to play their roles, electoral accountability must function.