Abstract
In this paper we formulate general models for two types of “take-some,” or “protection,” social dilemmas. Pollution, over-exploitation of common property resources, and many other environmental problems are examples of “take-some” social dilemmas.
Misumi(1993a) classified social dilemma models into 12 categories and formulated general models for eight of them. However, we point out that two of these models, which express two different situations of “take-some” social dilemmas, are formulated inappropriately. We show that the implications of his models are special rather than general. Then we propose alternative models which formalize there two types of “take-some” dilemmas in general form. A crucial difference between our models and Misumi's is that we use general cost functions, whereas Misumi uses specific linear functions for costs imposed by non-cooperative actions.
One of our models is useful for analyzing the problems of polluting the “commons” which in non-selective for people (e. g., air pollution, global warming). Another is suitable for the “congestion” problems in selective commons, e. g., overuse of highways and parks. Since our models suffer from being static, we propose the investigation of social dilemmas with dynamic models to broaden their applicability to such topics as over-exploitation of common property resources.
