Sociological Theory and Methods
Online ISSN : 1881-6495
Print ISSN : 0913-1442
ISSN-L : 0913-1442
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Alternative Interpretation of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud in Fuzzy Valued TU Game
Shinichi ISHIHARAYukihisa UTSUMI
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2006 Volume 21 Issue 1 Pages 93-107

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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to characterize the Talmud solution in the bankruptcy game by using the core of the fuzzy valued TU game. It has the feature that the Talmud solution is an advantageous distribution rule for the player who is lending the little capital from a relative viewpoint. Additionally, it is clear that the distribution rule in Mishnah is the only stable method with no bias from viewpoint of satisfaction.
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© 2006 Japanese Association For Mathematical Sociology
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