Abstract
According to Giddens (1976), the main theoretical hypothesis of interpretative sociology may be formulated as in the following two statements which he calls “double hermeneutic”: (1) social actors hold their own theoretical knowledge about the world, physical or social, which emcompasses themselves, and social interactions as well as other social phenomena are basically the products of those knowledge: (2) the objects of the knowledge of social sciences are those phenomena which are constructed and structured by actor's theoretical knowledge. The reflexive nature of social phenomena and social theory lead interpretative sociologists to an assertion of methodological constraint for sociological inquiry. A. Schutz insists that sociologists should take subjective view-point in their inquiry. P. Winch insists that social sciences are different from natural sciences in that the former has to start with understanding of the rules which make social actions meaningful.
We may reasonably share the same theoretical hypotheses with interpretative sociology. But this does not mean that we should also share the same methodological rules. This paper examines the logic of the inferences through which those methodological rules are derived and shows that they are not warranted. Although the double hermeneutic may be the basic nature of social inquiry. Scientific inquiry of social phenomena is an activity which attempts to understand correctly the understandings of social actors.
